At first glance, his sojourn to India has been well worthwhile at least for the fact that it brought India into sharp focus on the US President’s personal radar -- its ancient heritage, culture ethos, its ongoing reforms and US prospects for the future. With a variety of activities ranging from coaching the Indian Government in New Delhi on conducting its foreign policy and urging women of Nay Village Rajasthan for investment in computers, to pursuing vigorous health reform in cybercity Hyderabad and sermonizing on poverty in Mumbai -- Clinton cast   his spell on India and in turn was charmed by it.

   Clearly, it was no mean achievement for the Clinton administration almost at the end of his tenure to narrow down the differences between India and the United States to the potential of an expanding partnership. The most tangible benefit was the higher visibility India gained at least in the eyes of the American investors who have acknowledged India’s economic potential. Toward that end, eleven business agreements aggregating $14 billion were signed--four in IT sector three each in environment and power and one in tourism.

The most significant benefit is the greater understanding of political issues. Both sides agreed to the institutionalization of dialogue between the two countries and initializing of a "vision" statement, as India’s foreign Minister Jaswant Singh observes: "There is a departure of nuances in Indo-US ties. There is a reassessment on the whole standing of India."

Should then one read this new found bonhomie as truly the beginning of a new alliance? New Delhi would be deluding itself if it downplays and ignores the anti-Indianism in American utterances. Not only the cold war remarks but the more recent ones, turning Pokran II in 1998 as a "historic mistake", highlighting the negative potential of the Kashmir imbroglio by describing the state as the "most dangerous place, and a nuclear flashpoint". And the latest description of Kashmir and Pakistan-held Kashmir as "zones of occupation". In other words, challenging the basic premise that Jammu and Kashmir lawfully ceded to India post partition.

The issue is really not the NPT.  Time and again, India has stressed that it would not sign the treaty unless it is "global, comprehensive and non-discriminatory." As it stands, nations in the region are having second thoughts on the NPT, which comes for a review next year. China broke the one-year global unofficial moratorium on nuclear testing by detonating an explosion in October 1998. North Korea has refused inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UN inspection teams have concluded that Iraq is continuing its nuclear weapons program.

Clinton is worried. Having failed in his Asian economic diplomacy unveiled November last year, he has now turned to India and Pakistan.  Pakistan is important strategically to the US, while India is vital from economic point of view. To meet both ends, Clinton has initiated a two-pronged strategy to beat both countries with the banner of Kashmir on the one hand and the slogan of NPT on the other.

On Kashmir, Prime Minister Vajpayee has firmly made it clear that India will not accept any third-party mediation. Of course, lame-duck Clinton has his personal reasons for being "hot on Kashmir". Having won accolades for his peace initiatives in Ireland, Bosnia, Middle East and Somalia, Clinton seems to be eyeing, among other laurels, on the Noble Prize for peace. He knows very well that the world would give him a big hand if he succeeds in resolving the long-running India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.

After Clinton made plain that the US would not accept nuclear status quo in South Asia, what remains to be talked about? Seen from the American perspective, Clinton’s mission was central to the US government’s fundamental policies of capping, rolling back and finally eliminating nuclear weapons program in potential flashpoints around the world. It is indeed, one of the most intricate post-cold war schemes Washington has taken up.

True to his commitment, Clinton conveyed to Pakistan New Delhi’s concerns on violence in Kashmir. In his 15 minute blunt speech on Pakistan TV, while stressing the importance of democracy, he warned Islamabad of isolation. Musharraf did agree to restart a dialogue at "any time, any place and any level. It is for India to respond now. The initiative must come from the bigger power.

Evidently, Clinton does not want to rub Pakistan the wrong way vis-a-vis China. Beijing is fast emerging as a major superpower with a strong nuclear arsenal, enjoying cordial relations with Pakistan, Iran and other neighbors. Besides, in the next ten years, China would grow significantly both militarily and economically, enabling it to exercise more power in Asia than the United States.

If India was about "nuances" and Pakistan about "keeping lines of communication open,” then there was more than just eye-contacting. Clearly, Clinton’s ambiguity on virtually everything has confused analysts of both countries. His speeches are so well crafted that India and Pakistan can read his lips anyway they want. Does Clinton’s South Asia trip mark a shift from the US policy on the region? Does it initiate a new level of relationship—a new hierarchy with India having an edge over Pakistan? Was US interest in India limited to only economics or to prop it up against the growing influence of China?

The answers to some of the questions could be found in a lecture, recently delivered by Karl Inderfurth, US assistant secretary of state, on South Asia: "Pakistan is important because it is a link—both economic and political-–between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, because it has significant human and economic resources, and because it has historically been a friend of the United States. For all three reasons, we intend to stay engaged with Pakistan, despite the current difficulties it is facing.

Washington has no doubt, agreed to join hands with New Delhi to eradicate terrorism. But the questions that we need to ask are: Is this support mainly motivated by Osma bin Laden’s declaration of war on America? Will Washington’s commitment to end terrorism extend beyond Laden? Will the US support India with no strings attached?

At another level, Clinton’s visit to Dhaka was not to provide a sympathetic ear to an impoverished nation in the world, which has neither the economic nor the military reasons to be taken so seriously. Trade ties between Bangladesh and the United States have risen very slowly, from a meager $653 million in 1991 to only $2.2 billion in 1999. The largest export from Bangladesh is clearly textiles. But the silver lining are the ongoing efforts of the US to tap Bangladesh’s natural resources, especially gas which is estimated to be between 10 to 40 trillion feet.

Besides, Dhaka also fits quite well into Clinton’s strategy of using the least developing nations to push through his agenda in the WTO. Washington hopes to use nations like Bangladesh to counter other developing countries opposing   American  agenda on the  WTO.  From that  standpoint, Dhaka is well-positioned to be the leader of the least developing countries than being a minor player in a large group serving no American interests. Clinton’s visit did identify a role for the US in both the labor and environment fields of Bangladesh.

Also one cannot forget the Chinese factor when discussing the Washington-Dhaka ties. Beijing had over the years come to exercise some influence in this country. To counter this, Washington is helping Dhaka develop its Chittagong Port, albeit, via the private sector. This port would give the US a free run to the Indian Ocean Waterways flowing from South Asia to the Gulf countries. Not only will this help the US to keep China in check in the region, it will also support Washington’s agenda to keep an eye on China’s nuclear activities on Myanmar-ceded Coco Island.

Thus, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh should be wary of Clinton’s double-talk. An element of this can be found in Wisner’s briefing: "From Kargil to the coup in Pakistan to the skyjacking, to now increasing violence along the Line of Control the region is showing a marked increase in tension. These issues must be addressed –ironically, only quietly and in diplomatic terms, for to take them public in India and in Pakistan is to distort and to cause great trouble for American diplomacy. We need to be clear about our principle but quiet in our pursuit of it.”