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June  2000

CONTENTS

 CURRENT AFFAIRS

   

       

 

 

Civil War Flares in Sri Lanka

    
 
  

The Impact of the War on Neighboring India

 
  

Pakistan Supreme Court Upholds Military Coup

 
 

Behind-the-Scene Games Overshadow Indian Cricket 

 
 

'Sixteen Decisions' and a Tale of Selina

  
     
 

    

  

 


Editor
Syed Badiuzzaman
  
Consultant
LaRue W. Gilleland
  
Arts & Literature Editor
     Sajed Kamal       
  
Community News Editor
   Nazli Siddiqui   
  
Correspondents
Nazmul Ashraf
(Dhaka)
   
Manju Biswas
(Newark)
  
Omar Faruk
(Toronto)
  
Poonam Kaushish
(New Delhi)
  
Fahim Reza Nur
(New York)
  
Nanda Wanasundera
(Colombo)
  
Bhagirath Yogi
(Kathmandu)
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

The Impact of the War on Neighboring India      

   

By Sugandhi Ravindranathan

 

BANGALORE -- With Sri Lanka back on the brink again with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) making major gains in the Jaffna peninsula, the pressure is on India to pre-empt the little island country from splitting into a northern Tamil nation and a southern Sinhala one. Some 40,000 Lankan troops are trapped in Jaffna and India, at the time of writing this report, is awaiting a formal Sri Lankan request for help in evacuating them, providing conditions are created for a cease-fire in the peninsula. Even so, experts foresee a long-drawn standoff in Jaffna. Though aerial bombing has slowed the LTTE, it has not stopped it.

Five years back, the Lankan army had driven out the Tigers from the peninsula, scoring a major victory in their battle against the LTTE fighting for a separate Tamil homeland. This time round, the exhausted troops are at the receiving end even as the LTTE cadres continue their relentless and bloody war, having made use of several previous cease-fires to accumulate more firepower. Once the LTTE columns bulldozed their way through the strategic Elephant Pass on April 21, the Lankan army's morale was in shreds.

Tamils constitute 18 per cent of the Sri Lankan population. The ethnic divisions in the island are as old as its independence from the British over 50 years ago, with violence erupting time and again. The year 1983 was a turning point with the emergence of the LTTE as a major player in the conflict, forcing then President Junius Jayawardhane to seek US and Israeli help to fight the Tamil militants.

In 1987, India burned its fingers when it sent its peacekeeping force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka, following an accord signed by Jayawardhane and then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Not only did the Lankan people resent what they perceived as Indian interference, but the IPKF, as one veteran soldier put it, “was forced to fight with one hand tied behind its back.” When Ranasinghe Premadasa was elected president in 1988, he armed and colluded with the LTTE to force the Indians, already demoralized because they had no clear mandate and were asked only to disarm the LTTE and not eliminate it, out of the island. The IPKF's withdrawal in 1990 was a major propaganda weapon for the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Rajiv Gandhi later paid for the misadventure with his life, when a human bomb, trained by the LTTE, exploded herself as she was touching his feet at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu, on May 21, 1991. Gandhi, then out of power, was in the middle of a comeback election campaign. Outraged Tamil Nadu voters bundled the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the regional ruling party, out of power. But the subject of Eelam, the proposed Tamil homeland, is an emotive one for these very voters today.

India's coalition government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, is generally in favor of carving out a solution within the framework of  “Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity.” But the government is at the mercy of a couple of Tamil parties who are trying to gain political mileage by declaring their support for Eelam. In fact, one of their leaders created a furore recently when, in a reference to the assassination attempt on Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga in which she lost an eye, that she has to be lucky each time “while we have to be lucky just once.”

If political considerations are forcing the Vajpayee government to tread carefully, there is near-consensus this time round in Sri Lanka on the question of Indian intervention. Both India and the United States have formally ruled out support for Eelam. The Clinton administration has voiced its concern over the escalation of fighting in Sri Lanka, especially over the fate of civilians caught in the strife, and is in close consultations with India. It is also supporting Norway's initiative to make way for dialogue between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government. Incidentally, both the US and India have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization.

The question now is, though India is trying to remain aloof from the conflict, can it afford to do so? Should Jaffna fall to the LTTE, the Indian navy, which is already on the alert, will have to move in to evacuate the Lankan troops. Moreover, there is the problem of refugees. Already there is a steady trickle of them who manage to get past the Coast Guards.  Thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils, who fled the fighting in the past, are now living in India.

There is some irony in India's predicament. During LTTE's initial years, it was India that propped it up, letting Velupillai Prabhakaran commute freely between India and Sri Lanka. The Indian government did nothing when Prabhakaran exploited Tamil Nadu politics to suit his purposes, dislodging the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) from DMK's sympathies and making use of then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran. Later, Prabhakaran went back on his acquiescence to the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayawardhane accord.

Even as Prabhakaran grew increasingly dictatorial in his territory, his Tigers resorted to extortion to fund the cause. Not only local civilians, but also Tamils living abroad had to shell out as much as 10 per cent of their income. Prabhakaran also eliminated all moderate Tamil leaders of Sri Lanka, like Neelan Tiruchelvam and Amrithalingam. His hold on the LTTE has been absolute since then. His cadres are mostly young people, thoroughly indoctrinated, who worship him. They're prepared to die for him and each has the notorious cyanide capsule dangling from his or her neck. Who can forget the BBC documentary that showed a teenager, who lost her arms in fighting, saying that she is prepared to pull the trigger of her gun with her teeth for the sake of her "Anna" (older brother)?

President Kumaratunga, in an interview with The Hindu, said: “He would like to be king of Sri Lanka,” and that it would be worse than having “Hitler and Idi Amin put together.” She said: “It was an Indian government some time ago that supported the terrorists on their soil, gave them not just refuge, but arms and training so that they could come back and start the war.” She also said that India could still have some influence on Prabhakaran if it really tried. Prabhakaran, incidentally, is still a wanted man in India in connection with the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.

Experts warn that an LTTE victory could have horrendous implications for not only Sri Lanka, but also India. They predict a witch-hunt for Tamils in Jaffna who "collaborated" with the government. On the flip side of the coin, Tamils who have fled to the south will be vulnerable to Sinhalese attacks. Should LTTE realize its objective, wrote veteran journalist Prem Shankar Jha in The Hindu, Jaffna will be the most ruthlessly militarized society in the world, with a worldwide system for collecting foreign exchange to purchase arms. He warned that an end to fighting would come as an anti-climax to the LTTE cadres who have been bred on “violence, hate and the cult of self-sacrifice and death.” The LTTE, to keep them occupied, would encourage them to complete their quest for a Tamil homeland, namely, the Indian state of Tamil Nadu itself, whose coast is within easy reach of LTTE's speedboats. Jha predicted that the LTTE would insinuate itself in Tamil Nadu's polity and that democratic Tamil parties would “find themselves caught, like the Akalis (in Punjab) between a small but extremely violent secessionist movement, and a reluctantly repressive Indian state.”

The LTTE is known to have connections with insurgent groups in India like the People's War Group in Andhra Pradesh, the Nagas and Bodos in the northeast and the militants in Kashmir and Punjab. An LTTE victory will be a tremendous morale-booster for these groups which will step up their militancy. India cannot afford to combat all these insurgencies simultaneously. The Vajpayee government should weigh all these considerations and act fast. Jha again: "Help from India will give Sri Lanka the will to continue fighting. But only if the goal is to eliminate the Tigers once and for all. This is not an easy choice. But the days of easy choices and endless temporizing are over. What India will soon face is a fight for its own survival."

 

 

       

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